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Brexit’s	institutional	irony:	how	the	EU	has
successfully	outflanked	the	UK
The	EU	has	been	popularly	derided	as	ineffectual,	but	it	has	shown	remarkable
co-ordination	and	unity	in	its	Brexit	negotiations	with	the	UK.	Dermot	Hodson
(Birkbeck	College)	and	John	Peterson	(University	of	Edinburgh)	explain
how	Michel	Barnier	has	outflanked	the	UK,	with	both	the	Commission	and	the
Council	presenting	a	united	front.
Before	British	voters	went	to	the	polls	in	June	2016,	the	institutions	of	the
European	Union	(EU)	were	dismissed	as	‘sclerotic,	over-centralised	and	undemocratic’.	Those	same	EU	institutions
are	now	portrayed	as	running	rings	around	British	negotiators.		Here	we	find	another	–	amongst	many	–	of	Brexit’s
ironies.
Michel	Barnier	in	2017.	Photo:	European	Committee	of	the	Regions	via	a	CC-BY-NC-SA	2.0
licence
This	state	of	affairs	stems	from	popular	misunderstanding	in	the	UK,	as	well	as	elsewhere,	of	how	EU	institutions
actually	work.	It	also	reflects	the	fact	that	Brexit	is	a	challenge	to	which	EU	institutions	are	better	suited	than	their
British	counterparts.	The	loss	of	two	senior	Cabinet	members	days	after	the	Cabinet	agreed	on	a	new	negotiating
position	makes	British	political	institutions’	deficiencies	all	too	clear.
Theresa	May’s	decision	to	put	David	Davis	in	charge	of	a	new	Department	for	Exiting	the	European	Union	(DExEU)
in	July	2016	helped	to	contain	cabinet	tensions	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	referendum.	But	it	also	weakened
the	UK’s	negotiating	position.	Creating	new	government	departments	is	not	something	that	Whitehall	tends	to	do
well	and	DExEU	has	struggled	to	recruit	and	retain	suitably	qualified	staff.	It	has	had	two	Permanent	Secretaries	in
two	years.
Davis	styled	himself	as	a	happy	warrior	in	leading	the	British	negotiating	team.	But	his	working	relationship	with	the
Prime	Minister	and	EU	counterparts	was	strained.	He	visited	Dublin	just	once	in	his	role	as	Brexit	secretary.	
Remarkably,	Davis	spent	just	four	hours	in	talks	with	the	EU’s	chief	negotiator,	Michel	Barnier,	in	the	first	half	of
2018.	At	home,	rumours	that	Davis	might	resign	re-surfaced	regularly,	until	he	finally	quit.	His	departure	and	that	of
Foreign	Secretary	Boris	Johnson	a	day	later	could	still	yet	generate	momentum	to	topple	the	Prime	Minister.
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Johnson	knows	better	than	most	British	politicians	how	EU	institutions	work.	His	father	was	once	an	official	at	the
European	Commission	and	even	wrote	a	novel	(which	became	a	film)	about	a	fictionalised	Commissioner.	Johnson
Jr.’s	understanding	of	the	UK’s	Foreign	and	Commonwealth	Office	(FCO)	turned	out	to	be	less	assured.	His	tenure
as	Foreign	Secretary	was	marked	by	multiple	gaffes	on	the	international	stage	and	a	bit	part	on	the	European	one.	In
spite	of	its	vast	experience	in	EU	matters,	the	FCO	has	been	sidelined	in	Brexit	negotiations	by	DExEU	and	Downing
Street.	So	much	so,	in	fact,	that	Davis	publicly	questioned	why	Boris	Johnson	had	resigned	over	the	Cabinet’s	new
negotiating	position	when	Brexit	wasn’t	‘central’	to	the	Foreign	Secretary’s	job.
EU	institutions	are	far	from	perfect.	They	can	appear	remote	and	rigid.		They	have	an	infuriating	habit	of	delaying
crucial	decisions	until	confronted	with	a	sense	of	impending	doom.	And	yet,	by	the	standards	of	international
diplomacy,	the	EU	is	both	efficient	and	democratic.	No	other	international	organization	has	a	democratically	elected
parliament	nor	one	that	carries	more	weight	than	many	national	legislatures.	None	wields	the	same	influence	that	the
EU	does	at	home	or	abroad	with	such	clear	rules	for	doing	so	and	across	such	a	wide	range	of	policies.
The	secret	to	EU	institutions’	success	so	far	in	Brexit	negotiations	has	been	member	states’	willingness	to	entrust
responsibility	to	the	European	Commission.	Article	50	of	the	Treaty	on	European	Union,	which	sets	out	the	steps
through	which	an	EU	member	state	can	leave,	gives	the	Council	of	Ministers	leeway	to	decide	who	should	be	the
Union’s	negotiator.	Reports	of	a	power	struggle	between	the	Commission	and	the	Council	over	this	role	proved
unfounded.	The	Commission	quickly	appointed	Michel	Barnier	as	its	chief	Brexit	negotiator.	EU	leaders	have	always
been	clear	that	Barnier	speaks	for	the	EU-27	as	a	collective.
Considered	by	some	to	be	a	controversial	choice,	Barnier	proved	to	be	a	smart	one.	Having	gained	a	good
understanding	of	the	Northern	Ireland	peace	process	during	his	tenure	as	European	Commissioner	for	Regional
Policy,	the	EU’s	chief	negotiator	was	quick	to	grasp	the	economic	and	political	repercussions	of	establishing	a	hard
border	on	the	island	of	Ireland.	He	has	worked	closely	with	the	Irish	government	to	address	their	concerns.		Barnier
has	always	made	clear	that	there	can	be	no	backsliding	on	a	backstop	to	prevent	border	checks	between	Ireland	and
Northern	Ireland	after	Brexit.
The	British	government	has	also	found	it	difficult	to	gain	traction	in	the	EU’s	most	powerful	institution:	the	European
Council.	This	difficulty	is	not	simply	a	matter	of	chemistry	(or	lack	thereof)	between	Theresa	May	and	other	EU
leaders.	It	reflects	the	fact	that	the	UK,	as	soon	as	it	voted	to	leave	the	EU,	was	excluded	from	the	European
Council’s	deliberative	working	methods.	Meeting	informally	among	themselves	since	2016,	the	heads	of	state	or
government	of	the	EU-27	(that	is:	all	EU	member	states	except	the	UK)	have	spoken	with	one	voice	on	Brexit.	The
European	Council,	meanwhile,	has	severely	restricted	the	time	devoted	to	Brexit,	making	it	difficult	for	Theresa	May
to	bypass	formal	talks	between	her	government	and	the	European	Commission.
EU	institutions’	‘transformation’	from	bloated	bureaucracy	to	a	lean,	mean	negotiation	machine	may	be	an	irony,	but
is	a	bitter	one	–	for	three	reasons.
First,	it	provides	further	evidence	of	how	the	UK’s	vote	to	leave	the	EU	was	premised,	in	part,	on	a	popular
misunderstanding	of	how	the	EU	works.
Second,	the	UK’s	struggles	to	engage	with	withdrawal	negotiations	may	strengthen	the	EU’s	negotiating	hand.
But	they	will	leave	both	sides	worse	off	if	a	hard	Brexit	ensues.
Third,	the	unity	of	purpose	that	EU	institutions	have	shown	over	Brexit	is	lacking	on	other	pressing	policy
challenges,	most	notably	over	migration,	eurozone	reform	and	democratic	backsliding	in	Poland	and	Hungary.
EU	institutions	may	be	having	a	good	Brexit,	but	this	result	gives	Europe	no	grounds	for	complacency.
	This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Dermot	Hodson	is	Reader	in	Political	Economy	at	Birkbeck	College.
John	Peterson	is	Professor	of	International	Politics	at	the	University	of	Edinburgh.	Together	they	edit	The	Institutions
of	the	European	Union,	now	in	its	fourth	edition,	having	previously	been	edited	by	John	Peterson	and	Michael
Shackleton.
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